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Article 6 of the Paris Agreement established 
three approaches for countries to cooperate 
with each other: cooperative approaches, a new 
mechanism to promote mitigation and sustain­
able development (“sustainable development 
mechanism”), and a framework for non-market 
approaches. However, while the “sustainable 
development mechanism” seems familiar as its 
principles strongly resemble the Kyoto Proto­
col’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),
the other two approaches have so far not been 
clearly defined conceptually. Views by Parties 
and observes that were submitted  at the end 
of September reveal some sharp differences in 
opinions on how Art. 6 should work.
What Are ITMOs? 
Art. 6.2 and 6.3 provides the option for Parties 
to directly engage in “cooperative approaches” 
and to use “internationally transferred mitiga­
tion outcomes” (ITMOs) in achieving their na­
tionally determined contributions (NDCs). While
a mitigation outcome could in theory be ex­
pressed in terms of GHGs or in terms of non-
GHG indicators (e.g. renewable energy capaci­
ty), which some NDCs focus on, among the Par­
ties that express themselves on this issue there 
so far is a clear preference to define ITMOs in 
tonnes of CO2-equivalent. However, there is a 
split on what cooperative approaches are.
While some hold that the concept should in­
clude any kind of cooperation between two or 
more countries seeking to transfer mitigation 
outcomes, others hold that Art. 6.2 should only 
provide for international transfers of mitigation 
surpluses for the achievement of NDCs. In their 
view Art. 6.2 is not to cover domestic, subna­
tional or regional emissions trading schemes. 
Raising Ambition 
While the Paris Agreement mandates that Art. 6 
should contribute to increasing climate ambi­
tion, most submissions do not discuss this issue 
in detail. Many simply assume that being able 
to cooperate will allow Parties to be more ambi­
tious in their NDCs by making use of lower 
marginal abatement costs and/or foreign direct 
investment. By contrast, Brazil stipulates that 
only absolute emission reductions going be­
yond NDCs should be eligible to be transferred.
Promoting Sustainable Development
Similar to the question of ambition, while the 
Paris Agreement mandates that Art. 6 should
promote sustainable development, many sub­
missions do not discuss this issue at all. The 
submissions that do discuss the subject mainly
revolve around the question of whether there 
should be international provisions on the pro­
motion of sustainable development, or whether 
these should be left to the host countries. In the 
first group, some suggest that the UN Sustaina­
ble Development Goals provide a universal def­
inition of sustainable development that could 
be used for assessing activities.
One Party notes that as in other provisions un­
der Art. 6, it may be necessary for all Parties en­
gaging in cooperative approaches to demon­
strate adherence to the requirement of 
promoting sustainable development.
Who Will Guide Cooperative Approaches? 
On governance, there is a split on the question 
to what extent rule setting and enforcement 
should be done centrally, or be left to individual
countries.
What Types of Activities under the "Sustain­
able Development Mechanism”? 
In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris 



















Submissions on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement
tainable development mechanism” is about 
“projects”, raising the question of the level of 
aggregation of activities (projects, programmes 
and/or sectors). Some countries argue for an 
“inclusive” approach in which projects, pro­
grammes of activities and sectoral approaches 
should all be eligible under the mechanism.
Others envisage the mechanism to operate on­
ly at the project level, with rules very similar to 
those of the CDM.
Accounting for National Policies in the Sus­
tainable Development Mechanism
When the rules for the CDM were discussed 
there was a fear of creating a perverse incentive 
for developing countries not to strengthen cli­
mate policies. The setting under the Paris 
Agreement is very different in that now all 
countries are expected to actively contribute to 
combating climate change. In the submissions,
there is a corresponding consensus that addi­
tionality and baselines will need to account for 
national policies, except where NDCs are explic­
itly made conditional on the provision of cli­
mate finance.
Accounting Emissions
Due to the a huge variety of NDC types, ac­
counting under the Paris Agreement will be 
much more complex than under the Kyoto Pro­
tocol. Some countries therefore consider that 
countries wishing to participate in cooperative 
approaches and the new mitigation mechanism
should be required to establish and quantify a 
budget of emission allowances or an annual tra­
jectory of emissions towards their NDC objec­
tives. Others suggest to further explore how 
reconciliation might occur between Parties with
different NDC types.
Various Parties note that accounting for Art. 6 
needs to be seen in the context of the work on 
broader accounting under Article 4.13, and on 
broader transparency under Article 13. They 
suggest that arrangements under Art. 6 are ad­
ditional to those under Art. 4.13 and applicable
only where Parties participate in transfers. 
Defining Non-Market Approaches 
Adoption of the framework for non-market ap­
proaches was mainly pushed by the Like-
Minded Developing Countries. In their submis­
sion, they outline some of the main purposes of 
the framework as assisting countries in imple­
menting their NDCs in a holistic manner by fa­
cilitating access to finance, technology transfer, 
and capacity building for mitigation and adap­
tation, and  contributing to map and register 
needs of countries and assisting them in match­
ing them with means of implementation, as 
well as monitoring the support provided.
Other countries caution to avoid duplication of 
work with other processes under the UNFCCC.
They suggest to focus discussions on possible 
synergies and coordination in non-market co­
operation. Various countries also suggest spe­
cific issues that could usefully be tackled under 
the new framework, such as fossil fuel subsidy 
reform.  
Ways Forward? 
Some of the discussions on Art. 6 are continua­
tions of previous discussions on establishing a 
“new market mechanism” and/or a “framework
for various approaches”. These discussions had 
for years revolved around the question of 
whether governance should be centralised or 
decentralised. Similarly, discussions on the 
scope of the “sustainable development mecha­
nism” echo past discussions on whether the 
“new market mechanism” should operate at the 
project or at the sector level.
Remarkably, discussions on non-market ap­
proaches seem to have moved past controver­
sies on the usefulness of this issue, or lack 
thereof. There seems to be some convergence 
on the way forward: listing and working out ex­







For the other two mechanisms, it may also be 
useful to take a step back and first discuss what 
issues will need to be resolved to make Article 6 
operational. This approach is taken by the sub­
missions of Canada and the EU. While the other 
countries lay out their positions in their submis­
sions, Canada and the EU mostly lay out ques­
tions that will need to be answered. First get­
ting a clearer picture of issues to be resolved 
may help defuse some of the controversies that 



























Submissions on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement
1 Introduction
 
Art. 6.1 of the Paris Agreement recognizes “that 
some Parties choose to pursue voluntary coop­
eration in the implementation of their national­
ly determined contributions to allow for higher 
ambition in their mitigation and adaptation ac­
tions and to promote sustainable development 
and environmental integrity.” 
Art. 6 subsequently establishes three ap­
proaches for countries to cooperate with each 
other:
•	 First, Art. 6.2 and 6.3 provides the option 
for Parties to directly engage in “coopera­
tive approaches” and to use “international­
ly transferred mitigation outcomes” in
achieving their NDCs. International super­
vision of these cooperative activities is not 
foreseen, but a work programme was 
agreed to develop guidance for Parties 
that want to engage in cooperative ap­
proaches.
•	 Second, Art. 6.4-6.7 establishes a new 
mechanism “to contribute to the mitiga­
tion of greenhouse gas emissions and sup­
port sustainable development”, referred to 
by many as “sustainable development 
mechanism”. In contrast to the cooperative 
approaches, this mechanism will be super­
vised by a body mandated by the Parties to 
the Paris Agreement. In addition, the Par­
ties are to adopt rules, modalities and pro­
cedures which must be observed when 
implementing activities under Article 6.4.
•	 Third, Art. 6.8 and 6.9 provides for the use 
of non-market approaches. Just how these 
approaches are to work will be determined
in the coming years with the development 
of a “framework for non-market approach­
es”.
All three approaches need to adhere to the 
cross-cutting principles established in Art. 6.1:
•	 Participation is voluntary for countries.
•	 Use of the cooperation mechanisms is to 
allow for raising climate action ambition, 
thus increasing the effort in terms of cli­
mate change mitigation or adaptation. This
goes beyond the “zero-sum game” of the 
Kyoto Protocol, where emission reductions 
achieved under the flexible mechanisms
were used one-for-one to offset emissions 
in the buyer country.
•	 The mechanisms are to promote sustaina­
ble development.
•	 The mechanisms shall ensure environmen­
tal integrity, meaning that all emissions
and reductions will be properly accounted 
for. 
The task of developing the guidance for coop­
erative approaches, the rules, modalities and 
procedures for the new mechanism, and the 
framework for non-market approaches has 
been mandated to the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
(SBSTA). After a first round of discussions at its 
session in May 2016, the SBSTA invited Parties 
and observes to submit views by 30 September.
This paper summarises the submissions to iden­
tify points of controversy and convergence.1 





odies=COP, reference FCCC/SBSTA/2016/2, para. 96, FCCC 
































Art. 6.2 specifies that Parties engaging in coop­
erative approaches shall promote sustainable 
development, ensure environmental integrity 
and transparency, including in governance, and 
apply robust accounting, inter alia, to avoid
double counting. In addition, Art. 6.1 mandates 
all approaches under Art. 6 to serve to increase 
ambition.
At SBSTA 44, Parties discussed a number of is­
sues, including  
•	 The nature of internationally transferred 
mitigation outcomes (ITMOs),
•	 The implications of different forms and 
types of NDCs,
•	 How the guidance would be applied, in­
cluding point of application (generation,
transfer and use of ITMOs), 
•	 Governance, 
•	 Accounting.2 
On basis of the mandate in the Paris Agreement 
and the SBSTA discussions, the discussion of 
the submissions is structured as follows: 
•	 The Nature of ITMOs and the scope of co­
operative approaches, including increasing 
ambition;
•	 The scope of the guidance and governance 
to ensure environmental integrity;
•	 Accounting;
•	 Sustainable Development. 
2 SBSTA 44 Item 11 a – Guidance on Cooperative Approaches re­
ferred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, Co­
facilitators’ note, Version of 21 May 2016 at 08:00.
2.2 Nature of ITMOs 
The submission by AILAC posits that ITMOs 
should be expressed in tonnes of CO2 equiva­
lent (tCO2e). Similarly, Ethiopia maintains that 
ITMOs need be GHG emissions reduction 
units as NDCs are themselves expected to be 
GHG reduction contributions.
To focus on reductions is emphasised by Brazil, 
who posit that “only surpluses that result in 
enhanced ambition should be contemplated 
under Article 6.2 (…) the amount of units eligi­
ble for trading should be limited to the differ­
ence between current emissions and the aver­
age of the last three inventories”. In practice, 
this would mean that only countries that are 
reducing their emissions in absolute terms 
would be eligible to participate under Art. 6.2.
In addition, Brazil envisages ITMOs to also in­
clude certified emission reductions under Art.
6.4 and CERs from the CDM. Thus, Art. 6.2 as 
such would only be open to countries with ab­
solute emission reductions while other coun­
tries would be limited to using Art. 6.4 and the 
CDM.
Along similar lines, New Zealand posits that 
Art. 6.2 is about the net outcome of Party-to-
Party cooperation. While cooperation may oc­
cur via linked emissions trading schemes, the 
purchase or trading of offsets, reductions trans­
ferred through the Article 6.4 mechanism, or 
government to government agreements to de­
liver emissions reductions, in their view what 
matters to the Paris Agreement is the net out­
come, not the individual transactions between 
businesses. Thus, in their view ETS units used in 


























Submissions on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement
By contrast, Norway holds that ITMO is a ge­
neric term that may include different types 
of units, including units from emission trading 
schemes and certified emission reductions. Re­
garding ambition, Norway assumes that the 
possibility to cooperate in implementing NDCs 
has made it possible for countries to assume 
more ambitious targets than if they were lim­
ited to mitigation within their own borders.
The OECD Climate Change Expert Group 
(CCXG) notes that a mitigation outcome could 
in theory be expressed in terms of GHG levels 
or in terms of non-GHG indicators (e.g. renew­
able energy capacity), which some NDCs focus 
on. However, CCXG also notes that none of the 
Parties with non-GHG NDCs have so far indicat­
ed an intention to trade with other Parties di­
rectly in terms of these non-GHG outcomes.
Similar to Norway, they further elaborate that 
ITMOs expressed in terms of GHGs could poten­
tially include: 
•	 Direct trade between NDC targets at gov­
ernment-to-government level;
•	 Units from domestically-governed mecha­
nisms, including ETS allowance transfers 
between internationally linked systems as 
well as units issued from baseline and cred­
it systems and used internationally; 
•	 Units from the new Article 6.4 mechanism;
•	 Units from existing UNFCCC mechanisms 
such as the CDM and JI. 
2.3 Scope of Cooperative Ap­
proaches 
Partly connected to the question of the nature 
of ITMOs, there is some controversy as to the 
scope of cooperative approaches. At one end of 
the spectrum, for example Brazil holds that Art.
6.2 “is analogous to emissions trading under Ar­
ticle 17 of the Kyoto Protocol” and should thus 
provide for international transfers of mitiga­
tion surpluses for the achievement of NDCs. In 
their view Art. 6.2 is not to cover domestic, sub­
national or regional emissions trading schemes,
which they suggest are only relevant as domes­
tic policies to be reported in national communi­
cations. Brazil also differentiates Art. 6.2 from 
Art. 6.4, where the latter involves mitigation ac­
tivities on the ground, whereas the former does 
not. As noted above, New Zealand similarly 
holds that Art. 6.2 is about the net outcome of 
Party-to-Party cooperation. While cooperation 
may take various forms, what matters to the 
Paris Agreement is the net outcome, not the in­
dividual transactions.
By contrast, AILAC posits that “cooperative ap­
proaches include any approach that involves 
two or more Parties (or subnational units there­
of, with the appropriate national authorization) 
and seeks to internationally transfer mitigation 
outcomes to be counted towards NDC goals”.
Australia similarly calls for accommodating 
both existing cooperative approaches and 
ones that are still to be developed, within 
and outside the UNFCCC, giving as examples 
the new Art. 6.4 mechanism, the World Bank 
Transformative Carbon Asset Facility, and na­
tional and sub-national linking arrangements.
The LMDCs also support an open approach, al­
lowing Parties to explore ITMO possibilities. 
The EIG posits that economic instruments will 
allow Parties to be more ambitious in their 
NDCs by making use of lower marginal abate­
ment costs and/or foreign direct investment.
They suggest that Art. 6.2 may cover national
and linked emission trading systems as well 
as “bottom-up approaches” elaborated by in­
dividual countries (whereas Art. 6.4 represents a 
multilaterally elaborated approach).  
The Centre for Clean Air Policy (CCAP) suggests 
that ITMOs should include the following charac­
teristics: support NDC implementation in both 
source and user country, support ambition, 


























eration as appropriate. In their view, a whole 
range of transfer arrangements could be ena­
bled , including:
•	 Carbon market mechanisms; 
•	 Bilateral/plurilateral arrangements by Par­
ties that do not involve the transfer of 
tradable securities but still transfer a veri­
fied reduction;
•	 Publicly funded reductions; 
•	 Transfer of recognition of parties providing 
support while the reductions are account­
ed for only in the host country inventory;
•	 Transfer of non-greenhouse gas based 
outcomes, such as energy from renewable 
sources, acres of reforestation / afforesta­
tion, etc.
CCAP cautions that there is a high risk that an 
ITMO generated within an NDC and used to 
meet an existing NDC of a buyer county would 
not result in additional ambition and would re­
sult in double counting. In contrast, an ITMO 
that is generated and used going beyond the 
existing ambitions of seller and buyer country 
NDCs would be certain to lead to an increase in 
aggregate ambition. CCAP notes that this re­
calls the supplementarity principle of the Kyoto 
Protocol, but now considered from both ends 
of the transfer. 
IETA posits that linking carbon pricing sys­
tems can help reduce mitigation costs and 
thus create the economic conditions for in­
creasing ambition in the future. In their view,
Art. 6.2 would be the vehicle for such linkages, 
whereas Art. 6.4 would apply to countries that 
are currently not in a position to establish a 
carbon pricing system but need the climate fi­
nance that the mechanism can bring. Art. 6 
could in their view also be a catalyst for estab­
lishing carbon pricing systems in such coun­
tries. In this way, Art. 6 has the potential to in­
volve all countries and to target whole sectors,
rather than only individual projects, as under 
the CDM and JI.  
Carbon Market Watch maintains that “all rules, 
oversight and guidance (…) must follow the 
leitmotif of higher ambition”. In their view, 
offsetting only displaces where emissions oc­
cur but does not lead to higher ambition. 
Therefore, only emission trading should be 
allowed, as it can lead to a robust carbon price 
in countries trading under an absolute cap.
Emission trading should therefore in their view
be allowed between Parties with ambitious 
NDCs. 
2.4 Scope of the Guidance and 
Governance to Ensure Envi­
ronmental Integrity 
On governance, there is a split on the question 
to what extent rule setting and enforcement 
should be done centrally, or be left to individual
countries.
Australia envisages environmental integrity 
criteria to be set at the national level. 
Brazil “strongly believes” that environmental
integrity can only be ensured if rules and gov­
ernance structures are multilaterally-agreed
and accountable to all Parties to the Paris 
Agreement. Similarly, the EIG posits that, based 
on the experience from the CDM and JI, over­
sight by the host country alone is not suffi­
cient to ensure environmental integrity.  
By contrast, Canada proposes to “provide a de­
gree of flexibility” supports “bottom-up” 
approaches, where Parties would demonstrate 
environmental integrity. In their view, Parties 
should be free to use their preferred approach­
es and bilateral (including sub-national) as well
as multilateral trading should be eligible. “Bot­
tom-up” approaches could in their view best be 

































Submissions on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement
gions involved – such as the Quebec/California 
cap-and-trade system.
Ethiopia similarly posits that the governance
of implementation should be led by the par­
ties involved.
Japan also maintains that it is the “prerogative
of Parties involved to generate, transfer and use 
ITMOs.” Thus, implementation and govern­
ance should be carried out under the respon­
sibility of the Parties involved, with guidance 
providing “possible measures” to take.
The LMDCs also emphasise that the guidance
should be of a facilitative nature, respecting 
the prerogatives of national authorities and al­
lowing Parties the opportunity to effectively 
explore ITMO possibilities. 
Mali, for the African Group of Negotiators 
(AGN), submits that a supervisory board will 
be needed to govern the use of ITMOs under 
the cooperative approaches and ensure their 
eligibility, based on the guidance.  
New Zealand also supports a decentralised
approach. They suggests that at a minimum 
Parties should report on how they are ensuring 
environmental integrity and be open to ex­
pert reviews. Parties should also have the op­
tion to apply higher standards if they so wish. 
Among the observers, Carbon Market Watch
holds that maintaining environmental integrity 
and transparency requires international over­
sight and governance. Therefore, issuance,
transfers, and use of ITMOs should in their view 
be reported to and tracked by a central UN­
FCCC body.
By contrast, IETA suggests that while the guide­
lines will be agreed by internationally, each 
Party will decide how it comports with the 
guidelines.
2.5 Accounting
2.5.1 General Mitigation Accounting 
Various Parties including Australia, the EU, 
Mali, for the African Group of Negotiators, 
New Zealand, and Norway note that account­
ing for Art. 6.2 needs to be seen in the context 
of the work on broader accounting under Ar­
ticle 4.13, and on broader transparency un­
der Article 13. The EU suggests that arrange­
ments under Art. 6.2 are additional to those 
under Art. 4.13 and applicable only where Par­
ties participate in transfers. New Zealand simi­
larly suggests to operationalize the accounting 
guidance as a “module” of the broader ac­
counting provisions to be developed under Ar­
ticle 4.13, to be used by Parties engaging in
cooperative approaches.
Ethiopia suggests a list of items that should be 
included in the guidance, including on 
•	 establishing baselines at policy, project,
program, sectoral as well as national level,
•	 converting target years and targets to a 
globally common denominator and fre­
quency,
•	 ensuring environmental integrity (domes­
tic and global),
•	 governance model and transparency in
governance of the mechanism,
•	 accreditation standards for MRV bodies.
The EU notes that the guidance will need to
address to different situations, e.g. whether re­
ductions are from within or outside the scope 
of a Party’s NDCs.
Norway holds that the guidance should also 
provide clarity on contributions through 
markets and finance mechanisms respective­
ly.
IGES suggests that the accounting guidance 
should accommodate Parties with different 
levels of capacity. In their view, a registry sys­























for its JCM, can be recommended for use by 
countries with low capacity. 
CCXG goes into substantial detail on account­
ing. They note that accounting starts with the 
inventory emissions within the scope of the 
NDC, then adding/subtracting tCO2-eq based 
on ITMO activity to give an ITMO-adjusted 
emissions level.
Counting ITMO activity could be done in two 
ways: counting issuances and retirements of 
all units that can be used internationally, or 
counting only net transfers of units across 
NDC boundaries, which includes international
transfers and banking.
Timing of accounting could also be done in
two ways, either only after the end of the NDC
target year/period, or on an ongoing basis as 
part of the biennial transparency framework,
presenting a time series of both inventory and 
ITMO-adjusted emissions.
They note that accounting only for the retire­
ment of units would cause complications if
banking is possible. Not accounting for issu­
ances could give a wrong picture of the host 
Party’s NDC achievement in the period where 
the units were generated while impacting the 
following period when the units are used.
2.5.2 Nature of NDCs 
At SBSTA 44, Parties identified the need to ana­
lyse the implications of the different forms and 
types of NDCs. Some Parties suggested that 
these differences may affect the creation and 
accounting of ITMOs. Some Parties posited that 
quantification of NDCs would be required to 
participate in Art. 6.2.3 
In the submissions, Brazil maintains that Par­
ties wishing to use Article 6.2 “should be re­
quired to establish and quantify a budget of  
3 Supra, footnote 2. 
emission allowances or an annual trajectory 
of emissions towards their NDC objectives, so 
that a mitigation surplus may be translated into 
mitigation outcomes that may be eligible for 
trading”.
Ethiopia maintains that ITMOs need to be 
GHG emissions reduction units as NDCs are 
themselves expected to be GHG reductions.
Along similar lines, the Ukraine posits that one 
of problems of the Kyoto mechanisms was a 
lack of simple and clear determination of meas­
uring and legal meaning of mitigation out­
comes. They therefore suggest to define that 
“any and all outcomes” from activities under 
Art. 6.2 and 6.4 “shall be quantifiable and 
measurable in Metric Tons of CO2 equiva­
lent.” In addition, they “shall be considered as 
[environmental] services [to ecosystems].” 
New Zealand similarly holds that ITMOs should 
be in tonnes of emissions reductions or tonnes 
of removals by sinks. In their view, cooperation 
is most suitable where Parties have comparable 
NDC types, for example quantified budgets. At 
the same time, they suggest to further explore 
how reconciliation might occur between Par­
ties with different NDC types. 
AILAC, Australia and Norway consider that 
guidance should be developed for all the dif­
ferent types of NDCs. At the same time, Nor­
way also mentions that participation Art. 6.2 
“will often require quantification of the NDC
and timely submission of inventories.”
Mali, for the African Group of Negotiators, 
posits that there should be no restrictions 
based on the type of NDCs, but at the same
time maintains that ITMOs need to be quanti­
fiable. 
Russia suggests that to ensure proper account­
ing, the receiving Party and the investor Par­
ty should have the same type of NDCs. 
Carbon Market Watch cautions that interna­
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a precautionary approach should be pursued.
In their view, eligibility for transfers should 
therefore be limited to NDCs expressed as 
“absolute multi-year emission budgets using 
common metrics (inventory methodologies and 
GWPs) that cover their economy wide emis­
sions after 2020.”  
CCXG notes that it will be necessary to decide 
how important it is to account with a high 
degree of precision, “i.e. to the last tonne”, or
whether it is sufficient to provide a less precise 
but representative picture of ITMO use. They 
opine that requiring high precision could limit
participation to Parties with certain NDC types 
while requiring less precision could allow par­
ticipation by a broader range of countries.
CCXG notes that single-year targets may not 
be representative of a country’s emission pro­
file. They suggest that this problem could be 
overcome by using average values over 
longer time series. They also note that even if 
Art. 6.2 were limited to Parties with multi-year 
budgets,  transfers from single-year targets 
would still arise under Art. 6.4. It will therefore 
still be necessary to develop accounting guid­
ance for this situation. 
CCXG also discusses the problems caused by 
BAU and intensity targets. They suggest that 
ex-post accounting is not difficult for such 
NDCs. Instead, the question is how much ex-
ante confidence is needed for accounting to 
be considered robust. Furthermore, lack of ex-
ante clarity on the NDC achievement may lead 
to overselling.
They discuss whether a distinction could be 
made between transfers made on the basis 
of a mechanism such as an ETS and govern­
ment selling. If transfers takes place via a 
mechanisms, it is the parameters of this mech­
anism rather than the NDC that are important.
For robust accounting, the mechanism would 
need:
•	 Its own accounting to be robust (avoid
double issuance, double selling, etc.); 
•	 To operate in a continuous manner (avoid­
ing “one-off” actions in the NDC target 
year); 
•	 To have good MRV/compliance provisions,
so that there is confidence caps and base­
lines are respected.
However, they caution that mechanisms could 
be established as a vehicle to sell “excess” emis­
sion units.
Finally, they note that there are many ad­
vantages to a centralised system of regis­
tries. In peer-to-peer systems, security is only as 
good as the “weakest link” and transparency 
would be lower. If some Parties do not want a 
centralised system, the accounting guidance 
will need to specify the information that needs 
to be reported from these registries as well as 
information on the registry system itself to en­
sure its robustness.
2.5.3	 Double Counting, Corresponding 
Adjustment 
The COP decision adopting the Paris Agree­
ment in para 36 specifies that the guidance for 
cooperative approaches needs to include guid­
ance “to ensure that double counting is avoid­
ed on the basis of a corresponding adjustment 
by Parties for both anthropogenic emissions by 
sources and removals by sinks covered by their 
nationally determined contributions under the 
Agreement”.
The EU submission maps out the ground to be 
covered by raising a number of questions on 
the corresponding adjustment, including:
•	 ‘What’ is adjusted, emissions or contribu­
tions, and using what process and institu­
tions? 
•	 Must adjustments be in respect of  either 
an emission reduction or a removal? The 





























•	 ‘How’ will ‘corresponding adjustment’ be
done? 
•	 Will there be a centralised record of refer­
ence levels and adjustments? 
•	 Will there be a log or registry of transac­
tions to facilitate adjustments?”
•	 ‘When’ will corresponding adjustment be
done and how will it relate to the overall 
accounting and compliance process?  
•	 Will the approach differ according to the 
type of mitigation action? If so how? 
Brazil contends that double counting should 
be addressed through establishing an instru­
ment analogous to the Kyoto Protocol’s Inter­
national Transaction Log (ITL), including pro­
cedures to ensure that transactions are 
authorized by both participating Parties.
The EIG suggests that avoiding double count­
ing requires arrangements at least in three are­
as: accounting of units, design of mecha­
nisms that issue  units, and consistent 
tracking and reporting on units.
Ethiopia posits that quantification of NDCs in
terms of GHG reductions is required to imple­
ment corresponding adjustment.
Japan suggests that the accounting guidance 
should request disclosure of information on 
the amount of units which are issued, acquired 
and transferred, retired and cancelled by the 
Parties engaging in the cooperative approach­
es. This information should be made publicly
available in a consolidated manner by the UN­
FCCC secretariat.
Japan also discusses details on double registra­
tion, double issuance, double usage and double 
claiming.
To avoid double registration and double is­
suance, the participating Parties should in their 
view be required to check whether a project
has already been registered under other 
schemes. Information to be made publicly avail­
able regarding registered projects under each 
scheme should therefore be harmonised.
Double usage should be prevented by reduc­
ing the amount of units in the transferring Par­
ty’s registry and increasing the amount of units 
in the acquiring Party’s registry accordingly. 
Furthermore, the transferring Party would need 
to check whether those units have already been 
used before.
Double claiming would be avoided by having 
the acquiring Party subtract the amount of the 
units from its own emissions to be assessed in 
terms of the achievement of its NDC, while the 
originating Party would add the amount of 
units to its own emissions.
New Zealand posits that the numbers in inven­
tories and in NDCs are key. While inventories 
themselves should not be adjusted and instead 
always reflect actual emissions and removals 
data, Parties could report on their NDC with 
additions or subtractions to account for 
transfers. These numbers should then be able
to be reconciled across Parties. The numbers 
could in their view most usefully be reported in
a tabular format. 
CCXG notes that while double claiming is to 
be avoided at the level of the individual Par­
ties, double issuance and double selling will 
need to be addressed at the level of individ­
ual mechanisms, by sound registry standards 
and governance procedures. 
They note that preventing double claiming re­
quires regular, robust GHG inventories using a 
common IPCC methodology and annual infor­
mation on ITMO activity.
They also note that the limited coverage and 
lack of granularity in national inventories
will pose problems: if an emission is not reflect­
ed in the national inventory because of lack of 
granularity or exclusions, there is no double­
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2.5.4 Sustainable Development 
As has historically been the case in the CDM,
the discussion on sustainable development re­
volves around the question of whether there 
should be international provisions on the 
promotion of sustainable development, or
whether these should be left to the host coun­
tries. Several submissions do not discuss sus­
tainable development at all, despite the man­
date in the Paris Agreement that cooperative 
approaches should promote sustainable devel­
opment.
The EIG posits that activities under Art. 6.2 and 
6.4 should be consistent with the Sustainable 
Development Goals, the sustainable devel­
opment objectives and strategies of the Par­
ties involved and with human rights. There­
fore, in their view “a sufficient level of host 
country approval process” is required. They 
also posit that the host party should confirm 
conformity with sustainable development, in­
cluding human rights. They also consider that 
the guiding principles on environmental integ­
rity should also address potential conflicts 
with other environmental aspects, such as 
biodiversity. 
By contrast, Ethiopia maintains that ensuring
domestic environmental integrity and domes­
tic sustainable development is a domestic 
prerogative subject to domestic regulations.
They suggest that host countries need be 
tasked with defining their domestic sustainable 
development benchmarks, but “preferably 
along globally tested best practices.” 
Mali, for the AGN, maintains that sustainable 
development criteria “are a sovereign prerog­
ative of countries” and must therefore be de­
fined at national level. Similarly, progress must 
in their view be monitored and judged at a na­
tional level through a national authority. How­
ever, they also suggest that progress should be 
reported at the international level and that a 
tool to help Parties to assess the sustainable 
development impacts of ITMOs would be wel­
come. 
Australia envisages sustainable development 
criteria to be set at the national level, as in
the CDM.
The submission by the LMDCs is somewhat in­
consistent. One the one hand they note that 
sustainable development is treated at the 
same level as mitigation in Art. 6. Therefore,
sustainable development “should be integral to 
all rules, modalities and procedures (…) other­
wise the mandate of the Article would be un­
dermined.” They therefore call for establishing 
“concrete measures and controls to ensure that 
ITMOs serve environmental incentives (…) 
while prohibiting perverse incentives, such as 
market speculation and excessive offsetting”, as 
well as negative impacts, such as spillovers and
externalities. On the other hand, they hold that 
the sustainable development mandate of Art. 6 
can only be addressed in a bottom-up man­
ner, as sustainable development means differ­
ent things to different countries according to 
their national circumstances and stages of de­
velopment.
New Zealand suggests that Parties could re­
port on their engagement in cooperative ap­
proaches and how this promotes sustainable 
development. This information would proba­
bly be qualitative and quantitative. They opine 
that “it may not be productive" for the guidance 
to be prescriptive about the exact content or 
form of this reporting as indicators for sustain­
able development are likely to be dependent 
upon national circumstances. They note that 
as in other provisions under Art. 6, it may be
necessary for all Parties engaging in cooper­
ative approaches to demonstrate adherence. 
Norway suggests that voluntary tools for re­
porting could be explored, as have been used 
under the CDM. Furthermore, lessons could be 
learned from the way safeguards have been 
dealt with in decisions related to REDD+. Access 






operative activities and stakeholder consulta­
tions are further elements where they see rele­
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3 The “Sustainable 
Development Mechanism”
3.1 Overview 
The “sustainable development mechanism”
seems familiar as its principles established in
the Paris Agreement strongly resemble the 
CDM. Most submissions therefore focus on is­
sues of implementation.
Based on the submissions, the discussion of is­
sues is organised as follows:
• Scope of the mechanism;
• Ambition;
• Institutional Arrangements;
• Methodologies and accounting; 
• Sustainable development; 
• CDM transition issues.
3.2 Scope of the Mechanism
As noted by the EU, in contrast to the Kyoto 
Protocol the Paris Agreement does not specify 
that the mechanism is about “projects”, raising 
the question of the level of aggregation of 
activities (projects, programmes and/or sec­
tors). 
AILAC posits that the scope of eligible activities 
should be “inclusive”, given the nationally de­
termined nature of Parties’ contributions. How­
ever, the also note the need for robust meth­
odologies as a prerequisite. 
Australia and Mali, for the AGN, also call for 
covering a broad range of activities, project­
based, programmes, sectoral, and others. 
New Zealand sees the mechanism as a sub­
category of Art. 6.2, as one way in which mitiga­
tion outcomes may be generated and trans­
ferred. In their view projects, programmes of 
activities and sectoral approaches should all
be eligible under the mechanism.
Norway similarly argues that the mechanism
should cover a variety of scopes, and allow for 
coverage of scopes to develop over time. They 
envisage project-based and other forms of co­
operation similar to those developed under the 
CDM and JI, as well as cooperation covering 
broader segments or sectors of the economy,
possibly including REDD+. In their view, the 
mechanism should aim to facilitate transfor­
mation towards low emissions societies, and fa­
cilitate a movement from project-based to
broader approaches over time.
By contrast, Brazil sees the mechanism as op­
erating at the project level and maintains that 
“specific scopes of activities” in paragraph 37(c) 
of the Paris decision refers to types of method­
ologies. In their view, such methodologies 
should be the same as in the CDM: large scale,
small scale, afforestation and reforestation, and 
carbon capture and storage activities. They 
suggest that the new mechanism shall adopt all
methodologies developed under the CDM mu­
tatis mutandis. 
The LMDCs advocate for defining the scope of 
activities in a manner to facilitate access of 
small and medium projects and initiatives. 
Mali, for the AGN, suggests that activities are 
to be implemented in developing countries 


























There also is some controversy on whether 
REDD+ could be included in the new mecha­
nism. The Republic of the Congo, for the Congo 
basin countries (Burundi, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tomé et 
Principe, Rwanda and Chad) call for including 
the conservation of tropical forestry ecosystems 
under the mechanism. Ethiopia similarly states 
that activities stated under Art. 5 of the Paris 
Agreement could be included.
By contrast, Brazil strongly rejects the inclu­
sion of REDD+ activities, arguing that attempts 
to link Articles 5 and 6 were equivalent to reo­
pening the discussion on the scale of REDD+ 
activities, which in their view has been settled 
by decisions agreed under the Convention re­
jecting the project scale for REDD+.
3.3 Ambition 
At SBSTA 44, some Parties posited that the 
mere availability of the mechanism to assist in
the achievement of NDCs will lead to overall 
mitigation. Others held that specific provisions 
would be needed to ensure that overall mitiga­
tion is achieved.4 
In its submission, Brazil suggests that activities 
under the mechanism should go beyond poli­
cies and measures currently envisioned by the 
host Party if the emission reductions are to be 
used towards another country’s NDC. How­
ever, this requirement would not apply if the 
reductions are to help achieve the host coun­
try’s own NDCs.
Brazil argues that a key difference to the CDM is 
the aim “to incentivize and facilitate participa­
tion (…) by public and private entities” – while 
4 SBSTA 44 Item 11 b – Rules, Modalities and Procedures for the 
mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Ag­
reement, Co-facilitators’ note, Version of 21 May 2016 at 08:00.
the demand for CERs under the CDM was origi­
nally driven by Annex I Parties, in their view the 
reductions from the new mechanism could be 
used by any actor for any purpose. It could thus 
become a tool for voluntary initiatives going 
beyond government action.
Ethiopia suggests that ensuring “overall miti­
gation” and “long term benefits” will need to 
take place at several levels. First, at the plant
level, the CDM’s approach of comparing a pro­
ject only to what would otherwise have been 
done by the same project participant falls short 
in their view. The new plant may still emit more 
than its peers in the host country, therefore, 
new plants should need to perform below the 
sectoral benchmark. Second, at the national
level, reductions can only be transferred if
they are in excess of the NDC, unless the NDC 
is explicitly conditional on international finance.
Japan suggests that to deliver “overall mitiga­
tion in global emissions”, the approaches taken 
under the mechanism on monitoring, report­
ing and verification should be different from
the ones under the CDM. However, they do not 
go into details on what those differences 
should be.
Mali, for the AGN, maintains that the mecha­
nism should be used to increase ambition and 
must be supplemental to Parties’ own ef­
forts, particularly for developed countries. In
their view, developed countries must primarily 
meet their NDCs through domestic efforts.
New Zealand holds that “overall mitigation” is 
to be delivered through use of conservative 
baselines and reference levels guaranteeing 
that reductions go beyond business as usual.
The Republic of the Congo, for the Congo ba­
sin countries , argues that the success of the 
mechanism will depend on the guarantee of a 
minimum carbon price. 
Carbon Market Watch devotes the most space 
to the issue of ambition. They argue that mar­
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tion beyond the overall cap set. To the contrary,
lowering the domestic carbon price through 
importing cheaper units may in their view lead 
to investment decisions leading to lock-in of
high emitting infrastructure.
They argue that three elements are key to in­
crease ambition beyond current national con­
tributions: producing a net atmospheric ben­
efit, promoting a paradigm shift, and 
limiting perverse incentives for unambitious 
NDCs. 
Regarding net atmospheric benefits, they argue 
that either reductions should be discounted, or 
the mechanism should be used for results­
based finance to purchase units and cancel
them. 
Regarding shifting paradigms, they argue that 
the mechanism cannot be used for investments 
that would lead to a fossil fuel lock-in or unsus­
tainable growth. In their view, fossil fuels 
should therefore be excluded from the scope 
of the mechanism. Furthermore, activities 
should not cause perverse incentives such as 
improving the profitability of high-emitting ac­
tivities or by creating a disincentive for gov­
ernments to strengthen national policies. In
their view, crediting should therefore be lim­
ited to least developed countries and small
island developing states, with use of ambi­
tious standardized baselines. 
Finally, they argue that a paradigm shift means 
moving towards programmatic interventions 
on the economy-wide or sector-wide scale
that fundamentally transform behaviour pat­
terns, sectors, markets, and investment pat­
terns. 
3.4 Institutional Arrangements 
AILAC supports bringing in useful elements 
from the Kyoto mechanisms, including the 
role of Designated National Authorities and 
creation of a centralised registry of actions 
and transfers. However, they caution that op­
eration of the new mechanism should be faster
than the Kyoto mechanisms.
Australia calls for effective, independent and 
transparent governance arrangements. In their 
view, the governance arrangements should 
operate independently of other mechanisms 
and include a governing board that is inde­
pendent, transparent and engages appropriate­
ly with relevant stakeholders. 
Brazil “strongly believes” that environmental
integrity can only be ensured by establishing 
multilateral rules and governance structures. 
In their view, the governing body should be 
similar to the CDM Executive Board. They pro­
pose that the Board of the new mechanism
could succeed to the CDM Board “in virtually
all aspects, including but not limited to its rules 
of procedure, code of conduct and guidelines 
for panels/working groups”.
Similarly, the modalities and procedures for 
the CDM and decisions by the CDM Board
should in their view be incorporated into the 
new mechanism. Similar to the CDM, activities 
under the new mechanism should be subject to 
national approval, validation by designated op­
erational entities, registration by the Board, 
monitoring by the developer, and verification 
by designated operational entities. At the end 
of the cycle, the Executive Board should main­
tain a registry of the certified emission reduc­
tions that have been issued, which would then 
be transferred through an instrument analo­
gous to the Kyoto Protocol’s International
Transaction Log (ITL) to the national registry of 
either the host Party or the acquiring Party.
The EIG posits that based on the experience of 
the CDM and JI, one may conclude that over­
sight by the host country alone is not suffi­
cient to ensure environmental integrity. There­






























•	 There should be project cycle procedures 
which ensure full transparency and make 
all documentation publicly available. 
•	 Only internationally accepted methodolo­
gies should be eligible for use.
•	 Auditors should be fully accountable for all
their activities to the authority regulating 
the mechanism.
•	 A notification to the regulator prior than 
the project start date should be required 
and retroactive crediting should not be al­
lowed.
At the same time, the EIG calls for assuring effi­
cient timeframes for approvals and for avoiding 
high verification costs.
Ethiopia argues that the rules for the new
mechanism should be substantially different 
from the CDM. Ethiopia sees a need for clear 
rules on the roles of the governing body and 
supporting bodies, including on how to pre­
vent the support structure from taking control 
of the governing body. They also call for rules 
to ensure equal representation of individuals
from all regions and cultural backgrounds in
each governing, technical support and routine 
operational body.
Furthermore, they see the role of DOEs as very 
different. The scale and nature of activities and 
the diversity of NDCs will require careful con­
sideration of the forms of verification that is
necessary under the new the mechanism. They 
also call for inclusive accreditation require­
ments recognizing the need for DOEs with re­
gional and cultural diversity.
Finally, they call for establishing a process of
annual monitoring and evaluation of the of 
the regulatory body, processes and outcomes,
to be undertaken by an external independent 
body commissioned by the CMA. In their view,
the current annual reporting to the CMP does 
not match expectations of transparency.
The LMDCs similarly call for establishing a reg­
ular process for reviewing the outcomes of 
the mechanism.
Furthermore, the LMDCs call for ensuring that 
the participation by private entities is only a 
complement to the Party’s own efforts, possi­
bly by establishing a threshold for the comple­
mentary participation of private entities.
Mali, for the AGN, maintains that the mecha­
nism should be operationalized drawing on 
key institutions and structures of the CDM. In
particular, they call for extending the role of the 
current CDM DNAs to ensure consistency in re­
porting with NDCs.
As noted above, New Zealand views the mech­
anism as a sub-category of Art. 6.2. Therefore, in 
their view the requirements for the promotion 
of sustainable development, ensuring envi­
ronmental integrity and transparency including 
in governance, and the application of robust 
accounting and corresponding adjustments are 
to be addressed under the provisions of Ar­
ticle 6.2. 
Norway suggests that the roles of host par­
ties, the governing body and the private sec­
tor could be different from the CDM as the 
setting under the Paris Agreement is different 
from the Kyoto Protocol. They propose that rel­
evant lessons could be drawn from schemes in­
volving results-based payments, such as NA-
MAs and REDD+.
Carbon Market Watch emphasises the need 
for impartiality in the governing body. In
their view, Board members should be free, in­
dependent, and not associated with Parties’
negotiating delegations. In addition, civil socie­
ty should have the opportunity to nominate 
Board members, all meetings should be open 
to the public, and all documentation on credit­
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3.5 Methodologies and  
Accounting
3.5.1	 Methodologies on Additionality 
and Baselines 
The submissions devote much space to the 
question of how additionality and baseline 
setting will work in the new context of NDCs. 
AILAC notes that the concept of additionality
will need to be adapted to the diversity of 
NDCs and should be simplified.
The EU similarly notes that the application of 
additionality will need to consider the pres­
ence of NDCs and national policies. Also gen­
erally, there are questions on how to operate 
depending on whether the NDC is quantified or 
not, whether the mechanism operates within or 
outside the scope of the NDC, whether the NDC 
is conditional or not. A further question is
whether Parties will need to identify before­
hand whether or how a class of activities con­
tributes towards their NDC before crediting is 
possible.
The EU furthermore wonders how sharing 
emission reductions among Parties could 
work. The EU suggests to discuss reflecting 
NDCs and their implementation in baselines 
and retaining / not generating emission reduc­
tions for a part of the reductions achieved.
Ethiopia argues that baselines will need to be
set at the national level to account for the 
NDCs. Sub-national baselines, as are possible in
the CDM, are in their opinion not compatible
with the nation-wide nature of contributions. 
Furthermore, most baseline methodologies 
were submitted by few constituencies. New
rules should be established for the top-down 
development and revision of methodologies
to allow use by all that wish to use them. 
Rules on additionality would also need to be 
different to account for past deficits, such as 
projects being able to operate at much lower 
carbon prices than was used in their demon­
stration of additionality. 
Mali, for the AGN, maintains that the mecha­
nism should draw on relevant reforms of the 
CDM, in particular PoAs, standardized base­
lines, and automatic additionality of micro­
scale activities.
Tunisia calls for building on existing institu­
tions, methodologies and procedures estab­
lished under the Kyoto Protocol. Complicated 
projects, such as in the building and transport 
sectors, should in their view benefit from sim­
plified procedures. 
Carbon Market Watch calls for facilitating ro­
bust accounting by encouraging Parties to 
move towards a standardized NDC format 
based on multi-annual emission budgets for 
economy-wide emissions. Furthermore, they 
note that while the Paris outcome on the new 
mechanism has no language on double count­
ing as Art. 6.2, the same approach should 
nonetheless be taken. They furthermore sug­
gest that oversight for the issuance, transfer 
and use of units should be mandated to the 
mechanism established by Art. 15 on imple­
mentation and compliance.
Eligible activity scopes should in their view be 
limited to project types that have a high like­
lihood of being additional, for example by in­
troducing a negative list to exclude technology 
types with low likelihood of additionality and 
regularly reviewing the list to account for tech­
nological progress.
Furthermore, they call for setting limits on
crediting periods, defined per project type in
the respective methodology. These limits 
should take into account the rate of innovation 
and change in the relevant sectors as well as 




















3.5.2 Double Counting 
Discussions on double counting mostly revolve 
around the relationship of the relevant pro­
visions relating to cooperative approaches 
and the new mechanism. 
Brazil is somewhat inconsistent on the ques­
tion of double counting. On the one hand, they 
argue that the language on “guidance to en­
sure that double counting is avoided on the ba­
sis of a corresponding adjustment by Parties for 
both anthropogenic emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks” is applicable only to Article 
6.2, not to Article 6.4. Therefore, the issue of 
double counting should in their view not be 
covered under Art. 6.4. On the other hand,
they posit that reductions must not be counted 
twice. If a unit is transferred to another Party, 
the host country will retain the mitigation
benefits in its national inventory, but should 
not be able to account for them towards its 
own NDC.
Japan suggests that accounting to avoid dou­
ble counting should be consistent with the 
guidance on Art. 6.2. Furthermore, institu­
tional arrangements for managing units
should in their opinion be different from 
those for the CDM, where only Annex I coun­
tries have national registries and the cost for 
operating and maintaining the international
transaction log is borne only by Annex I coun­
tries. 
3.6 Sustainable Development 
As in the CDM, the discussion revolves around 
the question of whether there should be inter­
national provisions on the promotion of sus­
tainable development, or whether these should 
be left to the host countries. Several submis­
sions do not discuss sustainable development 
at all, despite the mandate in the Paris Agree­
ment that the mechanism should promote sus­
tainable development.
Brazil posits that sustainable development is­
sues are a national prerogative and should 
therefore not be subject to multilateral anal­
ysis under the UNFCCC. Therefore, in their view,
the new mechanism must not include "top 
down" sustainable development criteria. In­
stead, the promotion of sustainable develop­
ment should be a “key factor” in the approval of
projects by designated national authorities.
The EIG posits that activities under Art. 6.2 and 
6.4 should be consistent with the Sustainable 
Development Goals, the sustainable devel­
opment objectives and strategies of the Par­
ties involved and with human rights. There­
fore, in their view “a sufficient level of host 
country approval process” is required. They 
also posit that the host party should confirm
conformity with sustainable development, in­
cluding human rights. They also consider that 
the guiding principles on environmental integ­
rity should also address potential conflicts 
with other environmental aspects, such as 
biodiversity. 
As noted above, the submission by the LMDCs
is somewhat inconsistent. One the one hand 
they call for establishing “concrete measures 
and controls to ensure that ITMOs serve envi­
ronmental incentives” and to avoid negative 
impacts. On the other hand, they hold that the 
sustainable development mandate of Art. 6 can 
only be addressed in a bottom-up manner.
Carbon Market Watch posits that “the world
has now found consensus on what sustainable 
development is” with the adoption of the uni­
versal Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
in 2015. They suggest that these can serve as a 
basis to evaluate efforts under both the CDM 
and future instruments such as the Art. 6 mech­
anism. In their view, public and private entities 
should monitor and report on how they pro­
mote the SDG. Furthermore, Parties acquiring 
units should favour mitigation activities that 
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Moreover, they call for requiring to conduct lo­
cal stakeholder consultations in a manner 
that protects the right to full and effective par­
ticipation of affected peoples and communities. 
They also call for establishing an institutional 
grievance process as a means of recourse for 
project-affected people and communities. 
The Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at 
Columbia Law School similarly calls for explic­
itly recognising, incorporating, and building 
upon human rights law and international la­
bour standards. In detail, they suggest:
•	 Committing to a “no harm” approach;
•	 Requiring project proponents to disclose 
information about the project and accept 
input from affected communities and indi­
viduals at the earliest possible point in the 
planning process, and to sustain an ongo­
ing dialogue with the public throughout 
project development and implementation;
•	 Requiring project proponents to avoid ad­
verse effects wherever possible, and to im­
plement measures to mitigate any adverse 
effects that cannot be avoided;
•	 Requiring community participation in the 
determination of proper mitigation 
measures;
•	 For projects with potentially adverse im­
pacts on indigenous people, requiring pro­
ject proponents to obtain the free, prior,
and informed consent (FPIC) from those 
people;
•	 For projects that result in displacement of 
persons or communities, requiring the pro­
ject proponent to offer resettlement op­
portunities, financial compensation, and 
other services as may be necessary to fully 
mitigate adverse effects. 

 
3.7 Transition from the CDM
Some submissions discuss what should happen 
to the CDM when the Paris Agreement starts 
being implemented in 2020.
Australia posits that the existing mechanisms
under the UNFCCC are not fit for a scaled-up 
post-2020 period, but transitional arrange­
ments should support continued investment.
Issues to consider include crediting periods that 
extend beyond 2020 and elements of the Kyoto 
mechanisms which could be adapted for the 
new mechanism.
Mail, for the AGN, calls for defining a transi­
tion pathway for registered CDM PoAs to the 
new mechanism to harness the potential for 
scale-up and build trust among stakeholders.
Norway notes that many CDM projects have a 
life span that may in principle go well beyond 
2020. In their view, host Parties should clarify
how emissions reductions from these activities 
are treated vis a vis their NDCs. 
They also note that the Kyoto Protocol is not 
limited in time and that, in principle, the CDM
could continue. In their view, it will be crucial to
keep the CDM operational until the true-up
of the second commitment period in 2023.
However, they question is whether it is worth­
while to continue to operate the CDM after­
wards.
Tunisia posits that CDM CERs should continue 
to be issued after 2020. More generally, in
their view ensuring continuity and a smooth 
transition from the CDM to the new mechanism
will be key. 
Ethiopia rejects a “blank check transition”
from CDM projects to the new mechanism. In
their view, there would need to be a process of 
“re-registration” on the basis of the new 
mechanism’s rules. This would include re­
assessing assumptions in the original addition­





baselines and activities that have a higher emis­
sion intensity than the national benchmark. Fi­
nally, projects that have been carbon financed 
for a seven year crediting period “should never 
be allowed to issue further under the PA since 
whatever barrier existed prior would most likely 
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4Non-Market Approaches
 
In contrast to the submissions on the other two 
approaches under Art. 6, the submissions on 
non-market approaches are at a rather general 
level. They mostly revolve around defining non­
market approaches and identifying possible 
ways forward for the discussion. 
Adoption of the framework for non-market ap­
proaches was mainly pushed by the LMDCs. In
their submission, they outline the main pur­
poses of the framework as, among others:
•	 Assisting countries in implementing their 
NDCs in a holistic manner by facilitating
access to finance, technology transfer, and 
capacity building for mitigation and adap­
tation; 
•	 Contributing to map and register needs of 
countries and assisting them in matching 
them with means of implementation, as 
well as monitoring the support provided;
•	 Establishing an information-sharing pro­
cess for non-market approaches at the na­
tional, regional and international levels;
•	 Supporting the development of tools for 
the implementation, measurement and 
monitoring of holistic and integrated ap­
proaches to address climate change in the 
context of sustainable development.
The institutional process or facilitative mecha­
nism is to have regional balance, and meet in 
parallel with the Subsidiary Bodies. 
AILAC defines nonmarket approaches as co­
operative approaches involving two or more 
parties where no transfer of ITMOs occurs in 
the implementation of NDCs. They suggest to 
limit the work programme to initiatives that 
are not developed anywhere else under the 
UNFCCC and align to the principles and con­
ceptual framework of Article 6. They suggest 
that examples could be development of NA-
MAs, reduction of black carbon and joint ini­
tiatives for the conservation of oceans and 
other ecosystems. 
In their view, results should be reported 
through the transparency framework so that 
emission reductions would be reflected in the 
biennial communications.
Australia defines non-market approaches as 
measures with an international dimension that 
produce abatement or other outcomes, but are 
not the subject of market-based transac­
tions. They envisages the framework to pro­
mote mitigation and adaptation ambition by 
creating higher awareness of non-market ac­
tivities in order to assist potential linkages, 
greater collaboration, and opportunities for 
leveraging investment.
In their view, the framework should be in­
formed by outlining non-market approaches 
that Parties are already undertaking or may 
pursue, as well as by information that Parties 
communicate under other articles of the Paris 
Agreement, including Art. 13. Such information 
sharing would help interested Parties to better 
coordinate and identify opportunities for non­
market activities. 
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) (Anti­
gua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Be­
lize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, 
St Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent and 
Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Toba­
go) also proposes some areas of work: 
•	 Fossil fuel subsidy reform; 


















•	 Policy reform to create the enabling envi­
ronment for increased deployment of re­
newable energy.
They suggest that the work programme under 
Article 6.8 might explore opportunities for pro­
gressing on these areas, regulatory approaches 
and initiatives undertaken or under considera­
tion, cost savings anticipated or achieved, im­
pacts on poverty eradication and sustainable 
development, synergistic measures undertaken 
to facilitate and support these transitions, barri­
ers and challenges faced in implementing 
measures and supporting impacted popula­
tions and sectors, types of goals and milestones 
set, policy support needed and/or available 
from the international community, ways to en­
gage the private sector, protection of vulnera­
ble sectors and communities, lessons learned 
for policy replication, quantified benefits 
achieved or achievable. 
They suggest that sharing of views and experi­
ence may benefit Parties in the implementa­
tion of their NDCs or design of future NCDCs,
as well as providing input to the Green Cli­
mate Fund or to other initiatives aiming to 
support transformative approaches.
The EU suggests that the focus of discussions 
should lie on “how to enhance linkages and 
create synergies” and “how to facilitate the 
implementation and coordination of non­
market approaches”. 
In their view, Parties should, first, identify rele­
vant existing non-market instruments, second, 
identify existing linkages, synergies, coordina­
tion and implementation already occurring,
third, identify opportunities for the enhance­
ment of existing linkages, creation of synergies,
coordination and implementation of non­
market approaches, and, fourth, assess the re­
sults of the previous steps and draw conclu­
sions.
Ethiopia defines non-market approaches as 
any cooperative approaches that include every­
thing that is not a market approach for climate 
action and does not result in transferable 
units across national boarder. They further­
more suggest that these approaches should 
target both adaptation and mitigation; be par­
ticipatory for all national stakeholders; enhance 
sustainable development and poverty eradica­
tion; can entail cooperation on technology 
transfer, capacity building, finance, best prac­
tice; can provide enabling capacity to coordi­
nate and harmonize various instruments; and 
enhance the provision of means of implemen­
tation to developing countries Parties.
Mali, for the AGN, similarly defines non-market 
approaches as any effort, action or activity that 
is not reliant on trading. They give examples 
such as non-credited NAMAs, feed-in tariffs,
fossil fuels subsidies removal, and carbon taxes.
In their view, the framework must enhance 
linkages and synergies between existing 
mechanisms without duplication (mitigation,
adaptation, finance, technology development 
and transfer and capacity-building) and provide 
funding for developing countries’ NDCs. They 
call for strongly considering the importance of
adaptation activities with mitigation co­
benefits and high sustainable development im­
pacts. They also call for considering the linkage 
between climate finance and the new mech­
anism under Art. 6.4, and for establishing a 
tracking and/or reporting mechanism. 
New Zealand notes that there is a “myriad of 
policies and measures” countries may take. In
their view, the framework is about synergy and 
coordination in non-market cooperation. 
Similar to the EU, they suggest to first list ex­
amples of integrated, holistic and balanced 
non-market approaches. Secondly, one may 
consider how new and innovative approaches 
might be developed. They suggest that Parties 
should submit worked examples of how such 
cooperation might result in promoting ambi­
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NDCs. They provide one example on fossil fuel 
subsidy reform. 
Norway notes that the majority of climate­
related cooperation has so far not involved 
transfer of units. They envisage continued dis­
cussion on what sort of cooperation would 
fall under Art. 6.8 and 6.9, and their relations to 
other work streams under the Convention and 
the Paris Agreement. They suggest that issues 
such as the phasing out of harmful subsidies 
and urban planning could also be discussed.
Tunisia posits that Art. 6.8 needs to serve as a 
framework for all activities of international 
climate finance that aim at a long-term mitiga­
tion effect, including capacity building, tech­
nology transfer, carbon pricing, energy efficien­
cy labelling, consumer awareness raising,
eliminating administrative barriers, and others.
The Ukraine posits that combating climate 
change requires an innovative holistic financial
solution. They suggest that this solution lies in
the introduction of a new international cur­
rency exchange arrangement based on the 
balance of consumption of ecosystem ser­
vices and production of services to ecosys­
tems – the Environmental Balance Index (EBI). 
They define “services to ecosystem” as the ben­
efits ecosystems obtain from people, including 
services on the reduction of human activities’
impacts on ecosystems and activities related to 
recovery and protection of ecosystems. The 
balance of balance of consumption of ecosys­
tem services on the one hand and production 
of services to ecosystems on the other hand 
serves as indicator of the sustainability of de­
velopment.
The Ukraine suggests that the EBI could be ap­
plied at both the national and international lev­
els. Nationally, calculated at the enterprise level,
it could be used to determine taxation or as a 
basis for establishing an emissions trading sys­
tems. Internationally, it would serve as basis for 
determining the cross-currency exchange rates 
in foreign trade operations5, the New Exchange 
Arrangement (Monetary System). The value of 
currencies would be based on the correlation of 
the EBI of one Party to the EBIs of other Parties.
The Centre for International Sustainable De­
velopment Law (CISDL) notes that the role 
that States can play in climate change mitiga­
tion is not limited to the regulation of private 
actors. In fact, states themselves are central
economic actors. They posit that state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) dominate sectors which are 
critical to mitigation, particularly in emerging 
economies.  For instance, an estimated 80% of 
global oil reserves and 60% of natural gas re­
serves belong to SOEs, which generate 61% of 
global oil production and 52% of global gas 
production. State ownership in coal is limited in
the OECD countries but amounts to 66% in de­
veloping countries. More than a fifth of current 
greenhouse gas emissions relate to fossil fuels 
produced by just twelve SOEs. Moreover, SOEs 
control half of the world’s electricity generation 
assets, and so far SOEs have usually been more 
engaged in fossil fuels rather than in renewable 
energies.
They note there are two main trends in state 
ownership policies towards climate change mit­
igation: leaving or leading. That is, divesting, or 
exercising their influence to develop a sustain­
able model of development.
They suggest that the framework for non­
market approaches should further explore and 
raise awareness on the role that state owner­
ship policies can play in climate change mitiga­
tion.
IETA posits that non-market based approaches 
should meet the same Article 6 standards for 
emissions reduction accounting and track­
ing as market-based approaches, as well as the 
same standards for environmental integrity. 
They should therefore make use of mitigation 
infrastructure provided by the UNFCCC or oth­
ers, including monitoring and verification pro­
tocols for key sectors, standardized emission 




ance system to establish ownership of emission 
reduction units, a standardized reporting tem­
plate, an accreditation system for independent 























   
 




While the new mechanism under Art. 6.4-6.7 
seems familiar as its principles strongly resem­
ble the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM, the other two 
approaches have so far not been clearly defined 
conceptually. Consequently, submissions on 
the new mechanism go into implementation 
details whereas submissions on the other two 
approaches mostly try to define what the two 
approaches are. The submissions reveal some
sharp differences in opinions on how Art. 6 
should work.
What Are ITMOs? 
As some submissions note, a mitigation out­
come could in theory be expressed in terms of 
GHGs or in terms of non-GHG indicators (e.g.
renewable energy capacity), which some NDCs 
focus on. However, CCXG also notes that none 
of the Parties with non-GHG NDCs have so far 
indicated an intention to trade with other Par­
ties directly in terms of these non-GHG out­
comes. 
Among the Parties that express themselves on 
this issue, there so far is a clear preference to 
define ITMOs in tonnes of CO2-equivalent.
However, there is a split on what cooperative 
approaches are. Some hold that the concept 
should include any kind of cooperation be­
tween two or more countries seeking to trans­
fer mitigation outcomes, which could include:
•	 Direct trade between governments;
•	 Units from domestic mechanisms, includ­
ing allowances from emission trading sys­
tems and units from baseline and credit
systems; 
•	 Units from the new Article 6.4 mechanism;
•	 Units from existing UNFCCC mechanisms 
such as the CDM and JI.
By contrast, others hold that Art. 6.2 should on­
ly provide for international transfers of mitiga­
tion surpluses for the achievement of NDCs. In 
their view Art. 6.2 is not to cover domestic, sub­
national or regional emissions trading schemes.
Raising Ambition 
While the Paris Agreement mandates that Art. 6 
should contribute to increasing climate ambi­
tion, most submissions on cooperative ap­
proaches do not discuss this issue in detail.
Many simply assume that being able to cooper­
ate will allow Parties to be more ambitious in 
their NDCs by making use of lower marginal
abatement costs and/or foreign direct invest­
ment. By contrast, Brazil stipulates that only ab­
solute emission reductions should be eligible to 
be transferred.
The US-based Centre for Clean Air Policy (CCAP) 
cautions that there is a high risk that an ITMO 
generated within an existing NDC of a seller 
country and used to meet an existing NDC of a 
buyer county would not result in additional
ambition and could to the contrary result in 
double counting. In contrast, an ITMO that is
generated and used going beyond the existing 
ambitions of seller and buyer country NDCs 
would be certain to lead to an increase in ag­
gregate ambition.
Promoting Sustainable Development
Similar to the question of ambition, while the 
Paris Agreement mandates that Art. 6 should 
promote sustainable development, many sub­

















submissions that do discuss the question main­
ly revolve around the question of whether the 
provisions on cooperative approaches and the 
new mechanism should include international
provisions on the promotion of sustainable de­
velopment, or whether these should be left to 
the host countries. In particular developing 
countries posit that sustainable development 
issues are a national prerogative and should 
therefore not be subject to multilateral analysis 
under the UNFCCC. Others suggest that the UN 
Sustainable Development Goals provide a uni­
versal definition of sustainable development 
that could be used for assessing activities. In
particular non-governmental organisations also 
call for requiring to conduct local stakeholder 
consultations in a manner that protects the 
right to full and effective participation of affect­
ed peoples and communities. They also call for 
establishing an institutional grievance process 
as a means of recourse for project-affected 
people and communities.
One Party notes that as in other provisions un­
der Art. 6, it may be necessary for all Parties en­
gaging in cooperative approaches to demon­
strate adherence to the requirement of promo­
ting sustainable development.
Who Will Guide Cooperative Approaches? 
On governance, there is a split on the question 
to what extent rule setting and enforcement for 
cooperative approaches should be done cen­
trally, or be left to individual countries. Some 
countries propose to provide flexibility to “bot­
tom-up” approaches, where Parties themselves 
would demonstrate environmental integrity. 
“Bottom-up” approaches could in their view 
best be tailored to the unique circumstances of 
the regions involved. Other countries posit that 
oversight by the implementing countries alone 
is not sufficient to ensure environmental integ­
rity. They maintain that integrity can only be 
ensured if rules and governance structures are 
multilaterally-agreed and accountable to all
Parties to the Paris Agreement. 
What Types of Activities under the "Sustain­
able Development Mechanism”? 
In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris 
Agreement does not specify that the new “sus­
tainable development mechanism” is about 
“projects”, raising the question of the level of 
aggregation of activities (projects, programmes 
and/or sectors). Some countries argue for an 
“inclusive” approach in which projects, pro­
grammes of activities and sectoral approaches 
should all be eligible under the mechanism.
Others envisage the mechanism to operate on­
ly at the project level, with rules very similar to 
those of the CDM.
Accounting for National Policies in the Sus­
tainable Development Mechanism
When the rules for the CDM were discussed 
there was a fear of creating a perverse incentive 
for developing countries not to strengthen cli­
mate policies. It was therefore decided that new 
national policies would not need to be reflected 
in the demonstration of additionality and set­
ting of baselines of CDM projects.
The setting under the Paris Agreement is very 
different in that now all countries are expected 
to actively contribute to combating climate 
change. In the submissions, there is a corre­
sponding consensus that additionality and 
baselines will need to account for national poli­
cies, except where NDCs are explicitly made 
conditional on the provision of climate finance.
Accounting Emissions
While in the Kyoto Protocol all commitments 
are of the same type – absolute multi-annual 
emission budgets – countries’ contributions to 
the Paris Agreement have a huge variety of 
types. Some are targets for one year, some for 
several years, some refer to absolute emissions,
some to emission intensity, some to a deviation 
from business as usual, and some not to emis­
sions at all but to other indicators such as re­
newable energy. Accounting under the Paris
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plex than under the Kyoto Protocol. Targets 
that refer only to a single year are particularly 
problematic as emissions in that year may not 
be representative of the country’s usual emis­
sions profile.
Some countries therefore consider that coun­
tries wishing to participate in cooperative ap­
proaches and the new mitigation mechanism 
should be required to establish and quantify a 
budget of emission allowances or an annual tra­
jectory of emissions towards their NDC objec­
tives. Others suggest to further explore how 
reconciliation might occur between Parties with
different NDC types.
Various Parties note that accounting for Art. 6 
needs to be seen in the context of the work on 
broader accounting under Article 4.13, and on 
broader transparency under Article 13. They 
suggest that arrangements under Art. 6 are ad­
ditional to those under Art. 4.13 and applicable 
only where Parties participate in transfers. 
Defining Non-Market Approaches 
Adoption of the framework for non-market ap­
proaches was mainly pushed by the Like-
Minded Developing Countries. In their submis­
sion, they outline some of the main purposes of 
the framework as assisting countries in imple­
menting their NDCs in a holistic manner by fa­
cilitating access to finance, technology transfer, 
and capacity building for mitigation and adap­
tation, and  contributing to map and register 
needs of countries and assisting them in match­
ing them with means of implementation, as 
well as monitoring the support provided.
Other countries caution to avoid duplication of 
work with other processes under the UNFCCC.
They suggest to focus discussions on possible 
synergies and coordination in non-market co­
operation.
Various countries also suggest specific issues 
that could usefully be tackled under the new 
framework, including:
•	 Fossil fuel subsidy reform, this is men­
tioned by several countries; 
•	 Phase-out of inefficient and polluting 
technology; 
•	 Policy reform to create the enabling envi­
ronment for increased deployment of re­
newable energy; 
•	 development of NAMAs; 
•	 reduction of black carbon; 
•	 joint initiatives for the conservation of 
oceans and other ecosystems; 
•	 the role of state-owned enterprises in fossil 
energy provision. 
Ways Forward? 
Some of the discussions on Art. 6 are continua­
tions of previous discussions on establishing a 
“new market mechanism” and/or a “framework
for various approaches”. These discussions had 
for years revolved around the question of 
whether governance should be centralised or 
decentralised.
Evidently, these differences in opinion have not 
been settled. While cooperative approaches 
have been established as being subject to in­
ternational guidance, not international govern­
ance, there still is the same controversy on 
whether the guidance should be binding and 
whether there should be international supervi­
sion or not. There also is controversy on wheth­
er the guidance should concern individual co­
operative approaches or only the net mitigation 
results. 
Similarly, discussions on the scope of the “sus­
tainable development mechanism” echo past 
discussions on whether the “new market mech­
anism” should operate at the project or at the 
sector level.
Remarkably, discussions on non-market ap­
proaches seem to have moved past controver­
sies on the usefulness of this issue, or lack 





market approaches are ones that do not involve 
the transfer of mitigation outcomes. There also 
seems to be some convergence on the way 
forward: listing and working out examples and 
on this basis identify how to move on. Some 
submissions give specific examples of issues 
that could be worked on.
For the other two mechanisms, it may also be 
useful to take a step back and first discuss what 
issues will need to be resolved to make Article 6 
operational. This approach is taken by the sub­
missions of Canada and the EU. While the other 
countries lay out their positions in their submis­
sions, Canada and the EU mostly lay out ques­
tions that will need to be answered. First get­
ting a clearer picture of issues to be resolved 
may help defuse some of the controversies that 
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